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Percentage Leases: May Lessee Vacate Premises?
Stuart F. Kline*
A PERCENTAGE LEASE is one which states a minimum rental, and, above
that, an additional rental based upon a stated percentage of gross
sales.' The litigation posing the most difficulty in the area of percentage
leases involves the right of the lessee to vacate the premises. 2
There are several reasons why a percentage lessee might want to
abandon the leased premises before the expiration of the lease. First,
he may have a very successful venture and wants to increase its success
by lessening or eliminating the percentage of his sales that must be paid
to the lessor. Thus, he might abandon the premises in favor of a nearby
location with a more economically favorable lease. Second, the lessee
might be attempting to avoid a losing venture. His sales volume might
be quite high which, of course, would entitle the lessor to a large per-
centage rent. But, the cost of operations might be so high that maintain-
ing that level of sales would mean sustaining losses. 3
The cases involving the lessee's abandonment of the premises before
the expiration of the lease can be divided into two basic categories. The
first group of cases involves leases in which there is no minimum rental,
or, in which the minimum rental was so low as to be nominal. The sec-
ond group involves leases which provide for a substantial minimum
rental.
In those cases involving a nominal rent, the courts have been con-
sistent in inferring a covenant by the lessee to remain in possession of
the premises, and, to continuously operate his business as originally en-
visioned when the lease was executed. It has always readily been seen
by the courts that the percentage provision of the lease was meant to
provide the substance of the rent. Allowing the lessee to abandon the
premises would be allowing the lessee to simply stop paying rent. This,
of course, would defeat the purpose of the lease and could not be
tolerated.4
* B.S., Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, Univ. of Pennsylvania, Fourth-
year student at Cleveland State Univ., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; Account
Executive with a national chain-store leasing firm.
I Friendly Center, Inc. v. Robinson, 233 F. Supp. 274 (D. C. N. C. 1954); Heming-
way, Selected Problems in Leases of Community and Regional Shopping Centers,
16 Baylor L. Rev. 1 (1964).
2 Notes, Resolving Disputes Under Percentage Leases, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 1139 (1967).
3 Comments, The Lessee's Obligation Under a Percentage Lease, 60 Nw. U. L. Rev.
677 (1965).
4 Report of Committee on Leases, Am. Bar Assoc., Drafting Shopping Center Leases,
2 Real Prop., Prob., and Trust J. 222 (1967).
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Court decisions have not been as consistent in those cases involving
a substantial minimum rental. It is in this area that a very interesting
trend is developing. Until recently, most courts held that, in this situ-
ation, the parties did not intend that the lessee should be under an obli-
gation to continuously operate his business on the premises. They
seemed to reason that the substantial guaranteed minimum rent assured
the lessor of a fair return from his property, and, that the percentage
was merely intended to be a bonus or windfall should the business be
successful.5
Some recent decisions, however, indicate that the courts are becom-
ing more willing to closely examine the circumstances surrounding ex-
ecution of the lease in an effort to determine whether the parties them-
selves considered the substantial minimum rent to be an adequate re-
turn to the lessor." This trend is occurring concurrently with changes
which are taking place in the circumstances surrounding store leases.
Most new store construction today is taking place in the form of shop-
ping centers, and, the percentage lease is the rule, rather than the excep-
tion, in the modern shopping center lease. The exact percentage is nego-
tiated between lessor and lessee with as much importance as the mini-
mum rental. The percentage rental has become something other than a
"mere windfall," and, in fact, has become almost as much the substance
of the lease as the minimum rental. Therefore, this trend in the courts
today is a realistic appraisal by the courts of the context in which the
modern percentage lease is negotiated.
The specific legal issue confronting the courts in all percentage lease
cases is whether an implied covenant not to deprive the lessor of his per-
centage rent should be attributed to the lessee. 7 As mentioned above,
in those cases where the minimum rental was so low as to be nominal,
or, where there was no minimum rental, a covenant to continuously
operate, and, thereby, not deprive the lessor of his percentage rent has
consistently been implied. The courts have remained consistent in this
area.
8
For example, in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Davis,9 the premises were
leased for a service station. The rental was based upon the gallonage
sold at the station with a minimum rent of ten dollars per month. The
lessee stopped selling gasoline on the premises, but continued to occupy
the premises.
The court said that it was clearly within the contemplation of the
parties to the contract that the lessee would continue to sell gasoline
5 Notes, op. cit. supra n. 2.
6 Id.
7 Comments, op. cit. supra n. 3.
8 Report of Comm. on Leases, Am. Bar Assoc., op. cit. supra n. 4.
9 47 Ga. App. 601, 171 S.E. 150 (1933).
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throughout the term of the lease. Failure to sell gasoline was a breach
of the lease in a matter so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the
object of the lease. The court ruled that the lessor could collect from the
lessee a sum of money equal to the fair rental value of the premises.' 0
Similarly, in Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co.," the lessee had a
lease which provided for a rental equal to the greater amount of a stated
percentage of sales or a minimum. The lease contained a clause which
stipulated that the use of the premises would be for the sale and storage
of general merchandise, and for servicing automobiles, tires, batteries,
and accessories. The lessee moved the retail operation to a new location
before the expiration of the lease. Then, he used the premises solely for
storage, and tendered the minimum rental.
In this case, the facts showed that the minimum rental was a nom-
inal amount. The lessor had repaired and remodeled the building at a
substantial cost. These expenditures were made with the understanding
that the lessor would gamble with the lessee on the amount of retail
sales. Later improvements were made by the lessor without any charge
to the lessee in anticipation of increased overages resulting from in-
creased sales.' 2
In Lippman,13 the court said that the base rent was not a substantial
or adequate minimum rental and, therefore, the lessee impliedly cov-
enanted to continue selling merchandise in the premises for the duration
of the lease. The lessor received damages based upon overage rentals
paid in previous years by the lessee at that location.
Recent decisions have continued to follow this policy. For example,
in 1964, a Massachusetts court noted that if the minimum rent in a per-
centage lease is significantly below the fair rental value of the property,
then the conclusion can be reached that the parties intended that the
lessors would have the benefit of the percentage rent throughout the
term of the lease.'
4
The position of the courts is clear in these cases involving a percent-
age lease with a nominal guaranteed minimum rent. Courts have con-
sistently ruled, in this situation, that the lessee's vacating of the premises
constituted a substantial breach of the lease, and made the lessee liable
for damages to the lessor.'5
This situation differs, however, from that involving a percentage
lease with a substantial guaranteed minimum rental. In the past, the
10 Id.
11 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P. 2d 775 (1955).
12 Id.
'3 Id.
14 Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 200 N.E. 2d 248 (1964).
15 Sinclair Refining Co. v. Gliddens, 54 Ga. App. 69, 187 S.E. 201 (1936); Sinclair
Refining Co. v. Davis, supra n. 9; Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., supra n. 11.
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courts have allowed the lessee greater leeway, in this situation, with
respect to the use and occupancy of the premises.'
One decision which clearly shows the court's position in the strict
interpretation of a percentage lease is Cousins Investment Co. v. Hast-
ings Clothing Co. 17 In this case, the lessee vacated the leased premises
two months before the expiration of the lease term, and, paid the mini-
mum rental for those two months. The lessor brought action to recover
the additional percentage rental that he would have received if the ten-
ant had remained on the premises operating his business until the ex-
piration of the lease.
The court held that there was no implied covenant that the tenant
would operate its business in the demised premises throughout the term
of the lease. It reasoned that the terms of the agreement were clear,
definite, and unambiguous, and that there were no grounds to support
an implied covenant.' 8
The court further stated that covenants should be implied only (1)
where the implication must arise from the language used or was indis-
pensable to effectuate the intention of the parties, and, (2) where it ap-
pears from the language used that it was so clearly within the contem-
plation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it.
Furthermore, the court noted that there can be no implied covenant
where the subject is completely covered by the contract. 19
Although the court in Cousins followed a theory of strict inter-
pretation, they did leave some room for intent where the intent was very
clear. In the 1938 case, however, of Jenkins v. Rose's 5, 10, and 25¢
Stores, 20 the court was even stricter in their interpretation of the lease.
They were dealing with a similar set of facts as Cousins, but, they ruled
that even if one, or both, of the parties expected and intended that they
would use the leased premises for a particular purpose, the tenant is still
under no obligation to occupy or use the premises in the absence of
a specific provision in the lease.
Courts in later years continued to apply a strict interpretation to
the terms of the lease. In the 1958 case of Monte Corp. v. Stephens,
21
the lease provided that ". . . lessee agrees the leased premises is to be
used only for the conduct of business in selling baby and children's wear,
clothing and related items." The rental was the greater of a guaranteed
minimum or a stated percentage of gross income. The lessee abandoned
the premises before the expiration of the lease term, and the new tenant
16 Annot., 170 A.L.R. 1117 (1947).
17 45 Cal. App. 2d 141, 113 P. 2d 878 (1941).
18 Id.
19 id.
20 213 N.C. 606, 197 S.E. 174 (1938).
21 324 P. 2d 538, 539 (Okla. 1958).
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paid the lessor slightly more than the base rental for the balance of the
lease. The lessor brought action to recover the difference between the
amount tendered by the new lessee, and the amount that the original
lessee had been paying based upon the percentage rental.22
In Monte Corp.,23 the court held that there was no implied covenant
that the tenant abandoning the premises before the expiration of the
lease term was liable to the landlord for the difference between the rent
received by the landlord from the subsequent tenant during the original
term, and, the average rental which the first tenant had paid under the
percentage lease.
The court also followed this line of reasoning in Weil v. Ann Lewis
Shops, Inc.24 The lessee was on a percentage lease with an adequate
guaranteed minimum rental. Abandoning the leased premises before the
expiration of the lease term, the tenant tendered only the guaranteed
minimum rental. The lessor sued for the percentage rental. In a deter-
mination by the jury, it was found that both parties had intended that
the lessee would use and occupy the premises as a ladies' ready-to-wear
store. Nevertheless, on appeal, the court ruled that the lease was written
in plain, clear, and unambiguous language, and, that its construction was
a question to be decided by the court and not by the jury. The court
held that the tenant was under no obligation of continuous occupancy
and use in the absence of an express provision in the lease-regardless
of the intent of the parties to the lease.
In the 1962 Ohio case of Kretch v. Stark,25 the lessee stopped selling
merchandise in the leased premises 2/ years before the expiration of
the lease. The lease stipulated an adequate minimum rental and a per-
centage of sales. The court ruled that the lessee was not obligated to
occupy and use the premises for any definite period of time, and it re-
fused to infer any implied agreement or covenant to that effect. The
tenant was only liable for the fixed minimum rental for the balance of
the lease term.
Similarly, in the 1962 decision of Stemmler v. Moon Jewelry Co.,26
the defendant had been on a percentage lease with an adequate guaran-
teed minimum. He vacated the store 12 years before the expiration of
the lease and built a new store in the area. The defendant continued to
pay the base rental. The plaintiff sued for the additional amount above
the base that would have been received if the defendant had continued
to operate his business on the leased premises.
One of the lease clauses stipulated that the premises were to be
leased "... for the sole uninterrupted use and occupation of said prem-
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 281 S.W. 2d 651 (Tex. 1955).
25 92 Ohio L. Abs. 47, 193 N.E. 2d 307 (1962).
26 139 So. 2d 150 (Fla. App. 1962).
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ises by the lessee for the operation of a retail jewelry store." 27 Never-
theless, the court said that interpretation of the agreement must be based
upon what is written, and that there was no affirmative covenant made
by the defendant to operate a jewelry business on the leased premises. 28
Recent decisions, however, have not been consistent with the hold-
ings of these cases. In spite of past decisions which allowed the lessee
to vacate and simply pay the minimum rental, the present trend in this
area is to restrict the lessee's right to vacate the premises. 29
In the 1964 case of Simhawk Corporation v. Egler, 3 the lease pro-
vided that the tenant would use the premises "only for the purpose of
a shoe store engaged in the sale at retail of children's shoes and foot-
wear." The rental was to be a base rent plus a stated percentage of sales
in excess of a particular volume. The lessee vacated the premises before
the expiration of the lease term to move into a new store, and tried to
merely tender the base rental.31
The court ruled against the tenant, but it did not note any implied
covenants. In fact, the court relied upon the use clause in the lease to
show that the intent of the parties was clearly expressed by the language
of the lease:
The parties saw fit to include therein a provision that defendant in
addition to the minimum rental would pay a percentage of the gross
sale of shoes made in the shoe store conducted on plaintiff's prem-
ises. The source of the percentage rental was the shoe store and to
insure its continued operation the lease specified that the defendant
would use the premises only for such purpose.3 2
The lessee sought to introduce evidence showing that the minimum
rental by itself represented a substantial return on lessor's investment,
but this evidence was ruled to be immaterial. The court held that the
failure of the lessee to continue operating a shoe store on the premises
constituted a breach of the lease because the parties clearly intended
that the rental should include a percentage of gross sales above a certain
sales volume, and that to hold otherwise would be substituting a rental
payment clause entirely different than that to which the parties agreed.33
As compensation for this breach, the court said that the lessor was
due rent in excess of the base rent according to the expected sales of the
lessee as could reasonably be expected judging from past sales while the
premises were occupied.3
4
27 Id. at 151.
28 Id.
29 Notes, op. cit. supra n. 2.
30 52 Ill. App. 2d 449, 202 N.E. 2d 49, 50 (1964).
31 Id.
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Similarly, in the 1966 case of Ayres Jewelry Co. v. 0. & S. Build-
ing,35 the lease agreement stated that the leased premises were to be used
as a jewelry store, and for no other purpose, without the written consent
of the lessor. The rental would be a base rent plus a stated percentage
of gross sales above that base rental. The tenant vacated the premises
before the expiration of the lease term to open a new, larger store near
the old store.
The court, noting the use clause, said that to leave the premises
vacant was not to use it as a jewelry store. It emphasized the importance
of the use clause in this issue:
A paramount purpose, from a lessor's standpoint, is said to be the
amount of rent to be received, and when that amount is variable and
conditioned upon the use to be made of the leased premises, words
relating to the use intended are of primary importance and must be
construed and interpreted to have been intended as an express cov-
enant that the occupancy specified shall be continued during the en-
tire lease period so as to provide a constant base upon which the
agreed rent formula may be applied and the rent computed.
36
The court further said that the action of the tenant in abandoning the
leased premises before the expiration of the lease served to destroy one
necessary element of the rent formula. It held that this action by the ten-
ant constituted a breach of the lease contract for which the tenant was
answerable in money damages.
37
As can be seen from the above, there is some lack of general uni-
formity in the area of whether or not a lessee under a percentage lease
can vacate the leased premises before the expiration of the lease, and
merely tender the minimum rental.
38
Conclusions
With regard to percentage leases and the right to vacate, certain
ground rules can be deduced from court decisions. If the minimum
rental in a percentage lease is so low as to be nominal, or where there
is no minimum rental, then a covenant to continuously operate can be
implied 9 If the minimum rental is a substantial (more than nominal)
40
guaranteed minimum, then the courts, in the past, have ruled that a
covenant to continuously operate the business in the leased premises
35 419 P. 2d 628 (Wyo. 1966).
36 Id. at 632.
37 Id.
38 Notes, op. cit. supra n. 2.
39 Report of Comm. on Leases, Am. Bar Assoc., supra n. 4; Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Davis, supra n. 9; Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., supra n. 11; Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Gliddens, supra n. 15.
40 Report of Comm. on Leases, Am. Bar Assoc., supra n. 4.
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would not be implied. 41 However, there is a trend, at present, to restrict
the lessee's right to vacate the premises, 42 and, to hold that the failure
of the lessee to continuously operate the business described in the use
clause constitutes a breach of a percentage lease.43
This current trend is consistent with changes taking place today in
store leases. Percentage leases have become extremely common, and, the
percentage is no longer considered to be simply a "windfall" to the lessor.
The modern view seems to he that the landlord is entitled to his bargain,
and, his bargain is the percentage rent that would have been earned had
the business been operated throughout the term of the lease.44
41 Jenkins v. Rose's 5, 10, and 250 Stores, Inc., supra n. 20; Cousins Investment Co.
v. Hastings Clothing Co., supra n. 17; Monte Corporation v. Stephens, supra n. 21;
Stemmler v. Moon Jewelry Co., supra n. 24.
42 Notes, supra n. 2.
43 Simhawk Corporation v. Egler, supra n. 30; Ayres Jewelry Co. v. 0. & S. Build-
ing, supra n. 35.
44 Landis, Problems in Drafting Percentage Leases, 36 Boston U. L. Rev. 190 (1956).
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